Global Policing and the Case of Kim Dotcom by Palmer, Darren & Warren, Ian J
www.crimejusticejournal.com	IJCJ&SD	2013	2(3):	105‐119	 	ISSN	2202–8005	
		
©	The	Author(s)	2013	
Global	Policing	and	the	Case	of	Kim	Dotcom	
Darren	Palmer	
Deakin	University,	Australia	
	
Ian	J	Warren	
Deakin	University,	Australia	
	
	
	
Abstract	
In	 early	 2012,	 76	 heavily	 armed	 police	 conducted	 a	 raid	 on	 a	 house	 in	 Auckland,	 New	
Zealand.	 The	 targets	 were	 Kim	 Dotcom,	 a	 German	 national	 with	 a	 NZ	 residency	 visa,	 and	
several	 colleagues	 affiliated	 with	 Megaupload,	 an	 online	 subscription‐based	 peer‐to‐peer	
(P2P)	file	sharing	facility.	The	alleged	offences	involved	facilitating	unlawful	file	sharing	and	
United	 States	 federal	 criminal	 copyright	 violations.	 Following	 the	 raid,	 several	 court	 cases	
provide	 valuable	 insights	 into	 emerging	 ‘global	 policing’	 practices	 (Bowling	 and	 Sheptycki	
2012)	based	on	communications	between	sovereign	enforcement	agencies.		This	article	uses	
these	 cases	 to	 explore	 the	 growth	 of	 ‘extraterritorial’	 police	 powers	 that	 operate	 ‘across	
borders’	(Nadelmann	1993)	as	part	of	several	broader	transformations	of	global	policing	in	
the	digital	age.	
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Introduction	
On	20	 January	2012,	New	Zealand	 (NZ)	Police	 conducted	a	 ‘dramatic’	 raid	dubbed	 ‘Operation	
Debut’	(Amsterdam	and	Rothken	2013:	7,	14)	on	a	$30	million	mansion	in	the	Auckland	suburb	
of	Coatesville.	Their	target	was	the	eponymously	named	Kim	Dotcom,	owner	and	developer	of	
file	 sharing	 site	Megaupload.	 Activities	 on	 this	 site	were	 subject	 to	 extensive	 surveillance	 by	
United	States	(US)	Federal	Bureau	of	 Investigation	(FBI)	officials,	as	well	as	NZ	Police	and	the	
NZ	 Government	 Communications	 Security	 Bureau	 (GCSB).	 The	 raid	 involved	 76	 NZ	 Police	
officers,	including	members	of	the	Armed	Offender’s	Squad	and	Special	Tactics	Group	equipped	
with	 rifles	 and	 semi‐automatic	 weapons,	 several	 police	 dogs	 and	 two	 helicopters	 (Editorial	
2012).	 Dotcom,	 Finn	 Batato,	 Bram	 van	 der	 Kolk	 and	 Mathias	 Ortmann	 were	 arrested	 at	 the	
house	and	imprisoned	pending	extradition	to	the	US.	Simultaneous	raids	were	also	conducted	in	
Australia,	the	Philippines,	Hong	Kong,	Germany,	Canada,	the	Netherlands,	Britain	and	the	US.	A	
NZ	Police	liaison	officer	in	Washington	indicated	‘(f)eedback	on	the	New	Zealand	operation	has	
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been	extremely	positive	from	our	international	law	enforcement	partners	including	the	FBI	and	
the	US	Department	of	Justice’	(APNZ	2012).		
	
Two	 suspects	 eventually	 spent	 seven	months	 ‘detained	 in	 a	 foreign	 country	 away	 from	 their	
families	and	ordinary	places	of	residence’	(United	States	of	America	v	Dotcom	#2	[2012]	NZHC	
1353	 at	 para	 23)	 before	 being	 granted	 bail.	 Dotcom	 was	 subject	 to	 several	 restrictive	 bail	
conditions	including	electronic	monitoring	(United	States	of	America	v	Dotcom	#1	[2012]	NZHC	
328	at	para	41).	Around	$US175	million	of	Megaupload	business	assets	was	immediately	frozen,	
$NZ200	million	of	Dotcom’s	personal	assets	including	cash,	several	luxury	cars,	other	property	
and	 $NZ10	 million	 of	 government	 bonds	 were	 confiscated	 (Fisher	 2012),	 and	 up	 to	 150	
terabytes	of	computer	data	located	at	the	house	were	taken,	cloned	and	conveyed	to	the	FBI.	US	
officials	have	made	an	extradition	request	supported	by	a	72‐page	federal	 indictment	alleging	
several	offences	involving	Dotcom	and	Megaupload	related	to	‘breach	of	copyright,	racketeering	
and	money	 laundering’	 (Attorney‐General	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 GCSB	 v	 Dotcom,	 Batato,	 Ortmann	
and	van	der	Kolk	(hereafter	A‐G	re	GCSB	v	Dotcom	et	al.)	[2013]	NZCA	43	at	para	6;	Amsterdam	
and	Rothken	2013:	15).		
	
Of	itself,	this	considerable	use	of	police	resources	and	force	against	a	person	with	no	apparent	
involvement	 in	 violent	behaviour	warrants	 further	 scrutiny	 in	 light	of	 the	 ‘priorities,	 policies,	
practices	and	accountability’	associated	with	transnational	policing	arrangements	(Bowling	and	
Sheptycki	2012:	1).	However	our	purpose	 is	 to	 interrogate	 the	enforcement	processes	 in	 this	
case,	 as	 a	measure	 of	 several	 key	 transformations	 in	 global	 policing	 (Bowling	 and	 Sheptycki	
2012;	Palmer	et	al.	2012).	Specifically,	concern	over	the	extension	of	historical	offences	such	as	
copyright	 breaches	 to	 regulate	 new	 forms	 of	 digital	 crime	 that	 transcend	 conventional	
sovereign	borders	has	contributed	to	the	extensive	growth	of	‘extraterritorial’	law	enforcement	
(Nadelmann	1993).	The	Kim	Dotcom	saga	reveals	several	accountability	deficits	associated	with	
emerging	 international	 police	 cooperation,	 surveillance	 and	 extraterritorial	 law	 enforcement	
initiatives.		
	
The	 initial	 identification	 of	Megaupload	 as	 a	 potential	 site	 for	 US	 copyright	 piracy	 violations	
commenced	in	the	US,	where	a	Grand	Jury	hearing	in	the	state	of	West	Virginia	confirmed	there	
was	 sufficient	 evidence	 to	 issue	 US	 federal	 indictments	 against	 Dotcom.	 This	 compelled	 US	
authorities	to	seek	the	assistance	of	NZ	enforcement	agencies	to	gather	additional	evidence	to	
assist	with	the	extradition	and	prosecution	of	Dotcom	and	his	associates.	 	Any	US	prosecution	
depended	on	the	mutual	assistance	of	NZ	Police	and	GCSB	in	conducting	relevant	surveillance,	
arrests	and	in	seizing	evidence	under	NZ	law.	However,	the	process	has	not	been	as	seamless	as	
either	US	nor	NZ	 law	enforcement	agencies	had	hoped,	and	promises	 to	 take	several	years	 to	
formally	resolve.	This	is	partially	due	to	the	significant	financial,	legal	and	intellectual	resources	
Dotcom	 has	 been	 able	 to	 employ	 to	 challenge	 these	 global	 policing	 practices.	 Before	
documenting	the	tensions	to	global	policing	revealed	in	this	case,	we	situate	Dotcom’s	activities	
within	 a	 broader	 movement	 towards	 the	 expansion	 of	 traditional	 notions	 of	 copyright	 to	
criminalise	certain	trans‐sovereign	online	information	flows.	
	
Internet	piracy	as	global	crime	
An	ongoing	problem	associated	with	global	communication	flows	within	the	World	Wide	Web	
involves	the	ambiguous	proprietary	status	of	digital	imagery.	As	far	back	as	the	early	twentieth	
century,	 innovative	 uses	 of	 photographic	 and	 cinematographic	 technologies	 enabled	 the	
unlawful	 copying	and	smuggling	of	banned	 films	across	national	borders	 (Warren	2005).	The	
transnational	reach	of	digital	communications,	often	through	subscription	platforms	specifically	
engineered	 to	 share	 personal	 information,	magnifies	 the	 challenges	 for	 traditional	 notions	 of	
intellectual	property	law	that	sought	to	protect	revenue	derived	from	the	production	of	books,	
artworks,	 moving	 pictures	 and	 photographs	 in	 hardcopy	 form.	 The	 capacity	 to	 copy	 and	
disseminate	digital	representations	of	original	works	enables	contemporary	forms	of	copyright	
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piracy	 to	 transcend	 established	 sovereign	 laws	 and	 enforcement	 processes	 (Yar	 2005).	 The	
financial	 stakes	 are	 considerable,	 with	 estimates	 suggesting	 the	 net	 annual	 costs	 of	 illegally	
downloaded	 films,	 television	and	music	content	by	Australian	 internet	users	 is	around	$A900	
million	(McMahon	2011).	These	issues	can	only	be	reconciled	by	balancing:	
	
...	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 and	 human	 rights	 (to	 privacy	 and	 freedom	 of	
expression)	 …	 [and]	 multiple	 challenges,	 modifications,	 exemptions	 and	
limitations	to	a	universal	and	strong	form	of	property	rights	in	ideas,	in	principle	
and	in	enforcement	(David	2010:	5).	
	
Perhaps	 the	 most	 significant	 factor	 associated	 with	 online	 piracy	 is	 the	 development	 of	
subscription‐based	 peer‐to‐peer	 (P2P)	 file	 sharing,	 social	 networking	 and	 cloud	 computing	
platforms	enabling	users	to	exchange	and	access	the	personal	files	of	other	registered	users.	In	
the	 current	 ‘global	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 regime’	 (David	 2010:	 5)	 the	 scale	 of	 copyright	
violations	 that	 occur	 through	 P2P	 or	 cloud	 computing	 remains	 unknown.	 However,	 these	
platforms	 generate	 extensive	 concern	 amongst	 the	 entertainment	 industry.	 While	 some	
copyright	holders	have	introduced	technical	measures	–	such	as	‘cyberlockers’	–	to	prevent	the	
illegal	duplication,	downloading	or	sharing	of	protected	works,	these	measures	are	often	easily	
subverted	 or	 have	 limited	 impact	 in	 curbing	 online	 piracy	 (Lauinger	 et	 al.	 2013).	 The	
entertainment	 industry	 favours	prohibition,	heavy	regulation	or	 increased	surveillance	by	 law	
enforcement	 agencies	 and	major	 film,	 television	 and	music	production	 companies,	 to	prevent	
revenue	 losses	 to	performers	 from	 the	 sharing	of	 illegally	duplicated	 files	 through	multi‐user	
P2P	platforms.		
	
Traditionally,	alleged	breaches	of	intellectual	property	law	involved	private	claims	initiated	by	
artists	 or	 producers	 of	 original	 musical,	 film	 and	 television	 works	 (Marshall	 2002;	 Mazzone	
2011).	 However,	 the	 digital	 age	 has	 intensified	 criminalisation	 of	 online	 piracy	 and	 certain	
modes	 of	 P2P	 file	 sharing	 (David	 2010).	 Law	 enforcement	 agencies	 in	 the	 UK	 (SOCA	 2013),	
Australia	(ACC	2011:	73‐75)	and	the	US	identify	 intellectual	property	crime,	online	piracy	and	
the	 production	 of	 counterfeit	 hardcopies	 of	 films	 and	 music,	 as	 significant	 organised	 crime	
problems	with	potential	links	to	terrorist	activity	(David	2010:	97‐100).	Criminalisation	of	these	
behaviours	is	tied	to	the	‘transformation	of	the	language’	(Bowling	and	Sheptycki	2013:	35)	of	
transnational	 wrongdoing	 that	 has	 emerged	 in	 various	 global	 institutions	 and	 official	 United	
Nations	reports	since	the	1970s.	While	initial	forms	of	global	criminalisation	focused	largely	on	
the	 ‘trans‐boundary	 economic	 and	 social	 effects’	 of	 Western	 corporate	 business	 activities	 in	
developing	 nations,	 more	 recently	 the	 focus	 has	 shifted	 to	 protecting	 developed	 Western	
nations	 from	 the	 threats	 of	 transnational	 organised	 crime,	 drug	 trafficking	 and	 terrorist	
activities.	 These	 concerns	 are	 frequently	 ‘scripted	 by	 transnational	 policing	 actors’	 through	
networks	 promoting	 highly	 selective	 national	 law	 enforcement	 interests	 (Bowling	 and	
Sheptycki	 2013:	 34‐38;	 Deflem	 2004)	 within	 a	 global	 regulatory	 framework	 increasingly	
sympathetic	to	governance	through	crime	(Findlay	2008).	
	
Regardless	of	the	credibility	of	arguments	linking	piracy	to	organised	crime	and	terrorism,	they	
occur	 in	 a	 political	 climate	 that	 favours	 the	 expansion	 of	 criminal	 laws	 and	 enhanced	 global	
policing	networks	targeting	individuals	engaging	in	various	activities	that	are	potentially	illegal	
in	 one	 jurisdiction	 regardless	 of	 their	 geographic	 location.	 The	 expansion	 of	 extraterritorial	
criminal	 laws	and	enforcement	methods	has	arguably	been	most	notable	 in	 the	area	of	 illegal	
drug	trafficking	(Andreas	and	Nadelman	2006;	Costa	2004;	Kontorovic	2009),	and	occurs	either	
in	 conjunction	 with	 or	 independently	 of	 bi‐	 and	 multi‐lateral	 treaty	 requirements.	 In	 the	
financially	lucrative	and	highly	technical	world	of	the	internet,	the	extraterritorial	enforcement	
of	sovereign	laws	criminalising	‘intellectual	property	piracy’	(Wall	and	Yar	2010:	268)	presents	
significant	regulatory	challenges	in	a	borderless	digital	economy	(Ku	2002).	Technical	measures	
enabling	law	enforcement	agencies	located	in	one	nation	to	close	down	websites,	confiscate	any	
user’s	digital	information	or	undertake	online	surveillance	and	data	mining	operations	beyond	
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their	 own	 jurisdictional	 borders,	 raise	 numerous	 questions	 regarding	 extraterritorial	 policing	
activities	that	are	seldom	addressed	by	global	criminal	prohibitions	on	internet	piracy.	This	case	
study	 allows	 us	 to	 explore	 these	 issues	 in	 detail	 via	 the	 extensive	 body	 of	 NZ	 court	 rulings	
examining	 the	 legal	 dimensions	 of	 local	 policing	 responses	 to	 US	 requests	 for	 investigative	
assistance	into	the	allegedly	criminal	activities	of	Kim	Dotcom	and	Megaupload.	
	
Kim	Dotcom	
Kim	‘Schmitz’	Dotcom	is	a	German	national	holding	a	residency	visa	 in	NZ.	Dotcom	developed	
and	 managed	 various	 businesses	 associated	 with	 Megaupload,	 a	 cloud	 computing	 platform	
allowing	registered	users	 to	share	digital	photographs,	music	and	 films	with	other	subscribed	
users.	As	with	many	social	networking	sites,	 the	platform	has	significant	potential	 to	 facilitate	
both	intentional	and	innocent	copyright	breaches	on	a	global	scale.		
	
The	US	FBI	viewed	Megaupload	as	a	possible	site	for	illegally	sharing	pirated	films,	music	and	
television	programs.	After	preliminary	investigations,	a	Grand	Jury	in	West	Virginia	determined	
there	 was	 sufficient	 evidence	 gathered	 in	 the	 US,	 including	 10	 million	 intercepted	 emails,	
‘voluminous	 financial	 records	 obtained	 from	 a	 number	 of	 different	 countries’	 and	 data	
contained	 in	 rented	 servers	 located	 in	 the	US	 (United	 States	 of	America	 v	Dotcom	#2	 [2012]	
NZHC	 1353	 at	 paras	 19‐20),	 to	 support	 federal	 criminal	 indictments	 alleging	 ‘breach	 of	
copyright,	 conspiracy	 to	 breach	 copyright,	 conspiracy	 to	 racketeer	 and	 money	 laundering’	
(Dotcom	 v	 Attorney‐General	 #1	 [2012]	NZHC	 1494	 at	 para	 10).	 This	 combination	 of	 charges	
targets	the	unlawful	profits	from	site	subscribers	and	other	Megaupload	revenue	streams	that	
were	 linked	 to	 alleged	 criminal	 copyright	 violations	 under	 US	 law.	 Therefore,	 even	 if	
Megaupload	 developers	 or	 site	 administrators	 committed	 no	 copyright	 violations	 per	 se,	 the	
platform	 could	 facilitate	 breaches	 of	 US	 federal	 law	 by	 other	 registered	 third‐party	 users	
regardless	of	their	geographic	location	(Amsterdam	and	Rothken	2013:	19‐23).		
	
Prior	to	the	West	Virginia	Grand	Jury	ruling	on	5	January	2012,	FBI	officials	worked	informally	
with	NZ	Police	to	gather	preliminary	evidence	to	support	their	allegations.	These	arrangements	
were	formalised	through	a	mutual	assistance	request	from	the	FBI	to	the	NZ	Attorney‐General	
once	 the	 indictments	 were	 approved	 in	 the	 US.	 Mutual	 assistance	 legislation	 is	 commonly	
enacted	 in	 most	 jurisdictions	 under	 international	 treaty	 requirements	 (Joutsen	 2005)	 to	
facilitate	 transnational	 police	 investigations.	 The	 formal	 request	 sought	 the	 collection	 and	
transfer	 of	 any	 additional	 ‘evidence,	 fruits,	 and	 instrumentalities	 of	 the	 crimes	 being	
investigated’	(Dotcom	v	Attorney‐General	#1	[2012]	NZHC	1494	at	para	19),	including	physical	
property	 such	 as	 computers,	 hard	 drives	 and	 financial	 statements	 related	 to	 Dotcom	 or	 the	
Megaupload	businesses,	as	well	as	statements	from	any	witnesses	located	in	NZ.	On	19	January	
2012,	a	NZ	District	Court	Judge	approved	search	warrants	drafted	in	these	general	terms.	On	the	
same	 day	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Justice	 closed	 down	 all	 Megaupload	 servers,	 which	 were	
physically	located	in	Hong	Kong.	
	
The	scale	of	this	cross‐national	criminal	investigation	is	matched	by	the	flurry	of	proceedings	in	
NZ	 courts	 challenging	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 raids,	 the	 seizure	 of	 computers,	 hard	 drives	 and	
personal	property	by	NZ	police,	and	the	subsequent	cloning	and	transfer	of	digital	evidence	to	
US	 authorities.	 Between	 29	 February	 2012	 and	 9	 April	 2013,	 13	 major	 NZ	 court	 rulings	
examined	whether	Dotcom	has	the	right	to	access	details	about	any	information	transferred	to	
the	 US	 to	 assist	 in	 preparing	 arguments	 for	 an	 extradition	 hearing	 and	 any	 subsequent	 US	
criminal	 proceedings.	 An	 additional	 series	 of	 legal	 claims	 challenged	 the	 validity	 of	 asset	
confiscation	 orders	 under	 proceeds	 of	 crime	 proceedings	 that	 commenced	 in	 an	 Eastern	
Virginia	District	Court,	then	were	registered	by	the	Commissioner	of	the	NZ	Police	under	a	High	
Court	ruling	(Commissioner	of	Police	v	Dotcom	#1	[2012]	NZHC	634;	Commissioner	of	Police	v	
Dotcom	#2	[2012]	NZHC	2190).	This	allowed	NZ	authorities	to	sell	any	seized	assets	associated	
with	Megaupload.	 The	discussion	below	 focuses	 on	 three	 sites	 of	 legal	 dispute	 relating	 to	NZ	
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enforcement	activities	associated	with	the	extraterritorial	police	investigation	into	Kim	Dotcom:	
the	legality	of	the	search	warrant;	the	disclosure	of	evidence	seized	in	NZ	and	transferred	to	US	
authorities;	 and	 a	 related	 claim	 under	 the	NZ	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 Act	 1990	 seeking	 compensatory	
damages	for	unlawful	NZ	enforcement	and	surveillance	activity.		
	
Challenging	the	NZ	search	warrant	
Legal	 challenges	 to	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 search	warrants	 and	Dotcom’s	 claims	 for	 disclosure	 of	
evidence	 transferred	 to	 US	 authorities	 are	 interrelated.	 In	 a	 lengthy	 ruling,	 Chief	 Justice	
Winkelmann	 declared	 the	 warrants	 were	 legally	 invalid	 under	 NZ	 law	 because	 they	 did	 not	
mention	 the	specific	crimes	or	 types	of	evidence	 that	could	be	seized	by	NZ	Police	 (Dotcom	v	
Attorney‐General	#1	[2012]	NZHC	1494).	Although	initially	endorsed	under	NZ	law	and	in	line	
with	the	FBI’s	mutual	assistance	request,	the	broad	drafting	of	the	warrant	did	not	require	NZ	
Police	to	distinguish	Dotcom’s	personal	information	from	any	specific	evidence	directly	relevant	
to	 the	 US	 indictments.	 Evidence	 from	 a	 warrant	 later	 declared	 invalid	 is	 admissible	 in	 US	
criminal	 trials	 if	police	acted	 in	 ‘good	 faith’	during	 the	enforcement	operation	 (Dawson	1982:	
525‐30).	A	similar	discretion	exists	under	NZ	law,	even	if	a	search	related	to	a	defective	warrant	
is	later	declared	‘unreasonable’	(s.	21,	NZ	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990;	New	Zealand	Law	Commission	
2007:	126).	These	vagaries	in	the	rules	of	evidence	may	validate	intrusive	‘fishing’	exercises	in	
the	execution	of	broad	or	imprecise	warrants.	
	
A	 further	 question	 involves	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	 any	 data	 to	US	 investigators	 by	NZ	
Police	under	the	terms	of	the	Mutual	Assistance	in	Criminal	Matters	Act	1992	(NZ)	(MACMA)	(A‐G	
re	 GCSB	 v	Dotcom	 et	 al.	 [2013]	NZCA	 43	 para	 58).	 All	 data	 from	 computers	 and	 hard	 drives	
seized	during	the	raid	were	cloned	by	NZ	Police,	then	transferred	to	the	FBI.	This	was	contrary	
to	an	express	directive	from	the	NZ	Solicitor‐General	to	retain	the	evidence	pending	a	NZ	court	
hearing	 to	 determine	 which	 specific	 items	 of	 evidence	 could	 be	 lawfully	 provided	 to	 US	
authorities	(s.	49,	MACMA	1992).	This	unlawful	global	policing	practice	was	only	discovered	in	
judicial	review	proceedings.	That	the	NZ	Police	could	simply	ignore	the	chief	law	officer	of	the	
country	 is	 itself	 stunning.	 That	 such	 behaviour	 was	 only	 discovered	 by	 subsequent	 judicial	
review	highlights	the	lack	of	rigorous	procedural	scrutiny	and	accountability	for	global	policing	
investigations	short	of	extensive	legal	proceedings	after	the	event.	
	
Chief	 Justice	 Winkelmann	 ordered	 any	 clones	 of	 digital	 hard	 drives	 containing	 personal	
information	 irrelevant	 to	 the	US	 indictments	be	returned	to	NZ	 in	 light	of	 this	breach	and	the	
invalidity	of	 the	search	warrants	(A‐G	re	GCSB	v	Dotcom	et	al.	 [2013]	NZCA	43	at	para	11).	A	
subsequent	 ruling	 has	 affirmed	 original	 and	 cloned	 data	 collected	 during	 the	 raid	 under	 the	
MACMA	arrangement	were	unlawfully	obtained.	As	a	result,	NZ	Police	must	provide	a	full	audit	
of	all	information	seized	and	transferred	to	US	officials,	all	material	irrelevant	to	the	indictments	
is	 to	 be	 returned	 to	 Dotcom,	 and	 any	 cloned	 information	 in	 the	 possession	 of	 US	 law	
enforcement	agencies	is	to	be	destroyed	(Dotcom	v	Attorney‐General	#4	[2013]	NZHC	1269).		
	
Challenging	extradition	and	the	disclosure	of	US	evidence	
Kim	 Dotcom	 has	 also	 sought	 the	 disclosure	 of	 specific	 evidence	 held	 by	 US	 enforcement	
authorities	 to	assist	his	preparations	 for	an	extradition	hearing	 in	NZ	and	any	subsequent	US	
criminal	 proceedings.	US	 authorities	have	 resisted	 these	 requests	due	 to	 fears	disclosure	will	
prejudice	 the	 prosecution	 case.	 A	 Record	 of	 the	 Case	must	 summarise	 the	 allegations	 in	 the	
indictment	and	provide	sufficient	detail	of	evidence	to	sustain	the	extradition	request.	Dotcom	
argued	 the	 failure	 to	allow	sufficient	disclosure	compromises	principles	of	 fairness	associated	
with	criminal	 trials	 (ss.	24‐25,	NZ	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990).	This	argument	was	rejected,	as	 the	
procedural	requirements	for	extradition	hearings	‘are	not	of	a	scale	that	would	be	afforded	in	a	
full	hearing	[trial]	to	determine	whether	a	charge	is	proved’	(United	States	of	America	v	Dotcom	
#3	 [2012]	 NZHC	 2076	 at	 para	 119).	 However,	 extradition	 hearings	 are	 a	 judicial	 process	
requiring	partial	disclosure	under	a	broad	reading	of	section	27	of	the	NZ	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990,	
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which	 applies	 to	 administrative	 processes.	 Unless	 some	 disclosure	 is	 permitted	 to	 enable	
preparations	for	the	extradition	hearing,	an	applicant:	
	
will	be	significantly	constrained	in	his	or	her	ability	to	participate	in	the	hearing,	
and	 the	 requesting	 state	will	have	a	 significant	 advantage	 in	 terms	of	 access	 to	
information	 (United	States	of	America	v	Dotcom	#3	 [2012]	NZHC	2076	at	para	
119).		
	
US	 law	does	 not	 permit	 extensive	 pre‐trial	 disclosure	 of	 prosecution	 evidence	 until	 domestic	
proceedings	have	commenced.	This	means	Dotcom	will	only	become	fully	aware	of	the	details	of	
US	evidence	if	he	is	formally	extradited	from	NZ.	After	almost	a	year	of	legal	consideration,	on	1	
March	2013	the	NZ	High	Court	overturned	a	previous	order	 for	extensive	pre‐trial	disclosure.	
This	 means	 Dotcom	 is	 only	 able	 to	 access	 summaries	 of	 evidence	 in	 the	 Record	 of	 the	 Case	
prepared	by	US	authorities	to	establish	the	case	for	extradition,	with	additional	evidence	only	to	
be	 disclosed	 if	 the	 NZ	 extradition	 hearing	 identifies	 ‘specified	 items	 of	 inherently	 cogent	
evidence’	warrant	additional	disclosure	(United	States	of	America	v	Dotcom	#4	[2013]	NZHC	38	
at	para	110).		
	
The	shift	in	legal	standards	associated	with	the	disclosure	of	evidence	under	a	defective	warrant	
illustrates	 a	 broader	 shift	 in	 the	 law	 of	 extradition.	 Rather	 than	 the	 disclosure	 of	 compelling	
prima	facie	evidence	that	commonly	supports	criminal	charges	during	a	committal	hearing,	the	
NZ	High	Court	ruling	reinforces	a	growing	trend	towards	‘relaxed’	legal	requirements	associated	
with	extradition	proceedings	(Nicholls	et	al.	2007).	The	demands	of	global	policing	and	mutual	
assistance	 requests	 contribute	 to	 diluted	 legal	 standards	 relating	 to	 search	 and	 seizure,	
extradition	 and	 information	 disclosure,	 and	 highlights	 the	 potential	 for	 extraterritorial	
investigations	 to	 influence	 legal	 developments	 in	 other	 nations	 in	 favour	 of	 selective	
transnational	law	enforcement	objectives	(Bowling	and	Sheptycki	2012:	41‐2).	These	processes	
have	 significant	 potential	 to	 compromise	 the	 preparation	 of	 any	 defence	 to	 extradition	
proceedings	or	an	offshore	criminal	indictment,	even	though	a	disclosure	order	technically	has	
no	extraterritorial	effect	as	the	nation	challenging	the	ruling	will	do	so	directly	in	a	foreign	court	
(United	States	of	America	v	Dotcom	#3	[2012]	NZHC	2076	at	para	119).	
	
Compensation	under	the	NZ	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990	
After	 ruling	 the	 search	 warrants	 were	 invalid,	 Chief	 Justice	 Winkelmann	 suggested	 the	
unreasonable	search	and	seizure	(s.	21,	NZ	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990;	Dotcom	v	Attorney‐General	
#1	 [2012]	 NZHC	 1494	 at	 paras	 89	 and	 145)	 could	 be	 open	 to	 a	 common	 law	 claim	 for	
compensation	(Smillie	1994).	This	issue	was	not	raised	by	either	party	and	only	emerged	after	
several	teleconferences	and	the	exchange	of	memoranda	during	proceedings.	Dotcom	and	one	
co‐accused	 were	 allowed	 to	 add	 this	 claim	 with	 qualified	 support	 from	 NZ	 Crown	
representatives.	The	claim	seeks	acknowledgement	that	the	conduct	of	NZ	Police	during	the	raid	
warranted	damages	for:		
	
…	emotional	harm,	 the	cost	of	 reinstating	electronic	componentry	at	one	of	 the	
properties	searched,	the	cost	of	repairing	damage	to	the	properties	and	the	costs	
incurred	 by	 the	 respondents	 in	 attempting	 to	 obtain	 access	 to	 the	 information	
stored	on	the	computer	equipment	that	had	been	seized	(A‐G	re	GCSB	v	Dotcom	
et	al.	[2013]	NZCA	43	at	para	17).	
	
Common	 law	 remedies	 for	 violations	 of	 the	NZ	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990	provide	 ‘vindication	…	
compensation	and	denunciation’	for	the	unlawful	actions	of	government	agencies	(A‐G	re	GCSB	
v	 Dotcom	 et	 al.	 [2013]	 NZCA	 43	 at	 para	 18	 and	 note	 21)	 not	 otherwise	 covered	 by	 express	
remedies	clauses	under	enabling	 legislation	or	other	administrative	provisions	(referred	to	as	
‘Baigent’s	compensation’,	see	Simpson	v	Attorney‐General	(Baigent’s	case)	[1994]	2	NZLR	667;	
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New	Zealand	Law	Commission	1997).	During	hearings	in	August	2012	to	determine	the	legality	
of	the	warrants,	the	GCSB	admitted	to	conducting	illegal	surveillance	on	two	co‐defendants	who	
held	residency	visas	in	NZ	and	were	entitled	to	legal	protection	under	the	NZ	Bill	of	Rights	Act	
1990.	Once	these	admissions	were	made,	the	GCSB	and	NZ	Attorney‐General	were	listed	as	co‐
defendants	 in	 an	 amended	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 compensation	 claim	 endorsed	 by	 Chief	 Justice	
Winkelmann	on	5	December	2012	(Dotcom	v	Attorney‐General	#3	[2012]	NZHC	3268).	
	
The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 acknowledged	 the	 ‘present	 case	 has	 been	 characterised	 by	 unforeseen	
disclosures	 of	 information’	 (A‐G	 re	 GCSB	 v	 Dotcom	 et	 al.	 [2013]	 NZCA	 43	 at	 para	 50),	 but	
allowed	the	GCSB	to	be	included	as	co‐defendants	despite	objections	from	the	Crown	regarding	
the	availability	of	financial	compensation	for	any	procedural	violations.	Significantly,	arguments	
during	this	case	revealed	breaches	that	generated	public	admissions	from	the	GCSB	relating	to	
unlawful	 surveillance	 activity	 targeting	 Dotcom,	 his	 business	 associates	 and	 their	 respective	
families	 that	was	 subsequently	 conveyed	 to	 NZ	 Police	 to	 assist	 their	 investigations.	 This	 has	
generated	 additional	 claims	 seeking	 disclosure	 of	 this	 information	 and	 details	 of	 any	
intelligence‐sharing	agreements	between	the	NZ	Police	and	GCSB,	including	the	dates	and	times	
any	unlawful	surveillance	was	conducted.	These	claims	extend	to	any	information	provided	to	
‘other	members	 of	 Echelon/“Five	 Eyes”’,	 a	 signals	 intelligence	 sharing	 arrangement	 involving	
the	 ‘five	 eyes’	 of	 the	US,	Canada,	Australia,	NZ	and	 the	UK,	 and	 surveillance	data	 conveyed	 to	
‘any	United	States	authority’	(A‐G	re	GCSB	v	Dotcom	et	al.	[2013]	NZCA	43	at	para	53).	The	court	
accepted	Crown	submissions	 that	disclosure	of	any	 information	about	relatives	affiliated	with	
Megaupload’s	business	could	compromise	the	integrity	of	lawfully	intercepted	intelligence	and	
was	unlikely	to	have	been	forwarded	to	NZ	Police.		
	
Both	the	NZ	Police	and	the	GCSB	have	accepted	legal	responsibility	for	the	unlawful	surveillance	
and	Dotcom’s	entitlement	to	Baigent’s	compensation	(A‐G	re	GCSB	v	Dotcom	et	al.	[2013]	NZCA	
43	at	para	26).	The	amount	of	damages	was	 to	be	determined	prior	 to	 the	commencement	of	
extradition	proceedings	 (Bayer	2013).	The	hearing	was	originally	 scheduled	 for	August	2013,	
but	at	the	time	of	writing	had	yet	to	commence	due	to	unspecified	delays.	When	ruling	on	the	
extradition	request,	the	NZ	High	Court	will	consider	the	scale	of	the	unlawful	surveillance	and	
information	sharing	between	GCSB,	NZ	Police	and	other	members	of	 the	 ‘Echelon	group’.	The	
outcome	will	be	crucial	to	any	subsequent	US	criminal	proceedings	against	Megaupload	and	the	
related	disclosure	of	information	obtained	by	NZ	authorities	under	the	defective	warrants	that	
was	 transferred	 to	 US	 officials	 under	 the	MACMA	1992	 agreement.	 This	 ruling	will	 also	 have	
bearing	 on	 the	 disclosure	 or	 use	 of	 any	 communications	 relating	 to	 Dotcom	 or	 the	 other	 co‐
accused	that	are	subject	 to	 legal	professional	privilege	(Dotcom	v	Attorney‐General	#6	[2013]	
NZHC	697).		
	
More	broadly,	the	various	court	hearings,	appeals,	teleconferences	and	scrutiny	of	information	
flows	 within	 and	 between	 NZ	 and	 US	 enforcement	 authorities	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	
judicial	review	as	a	meaningful	forum	to	scrutinise	global	police	investigations.	The	very	active	
role	 of	 Chief	 Justice	Winkelmann	 in	 ‘calling	 out’	 the	 potential	 for	Baigent’s	 compensation	has	
produced	 significant	 admissions	 from	 the	 GCSB	 and	 NZ	 Police	 about	 their	 involvement	 in	
unlawful	 surveillance	 and	 information	 transfer.	 This	 common	 law	 remedy	 has	 significant	
financial	and	symbolic	deterrent	effects	that	reinforce	the	importance	of	localised	human	rights	
requirements	 and	 legal	 standards	 that	 affect	 police	 agencies	 receiving	 mutual	 assistance	
requests	on	 significant	 transnational	 criminal	 investigations.	This	 is	 a	poignant	 reminder	 that	
such	requests	and	any	related	legal	action	commenced	by	requesting	nations	in	other	domestic	
legal	systems	can	potentially	cancel	out	any	barriers	relating	to	the	extraterritorial	application	
of	law	in	offshore	criminal	investigations	(United	States	of	America	v	Dotcom	#4	[2013]	NZHC	
38	(1	March	2013	at	para	119).	Under	this	logic,	US	authorities	might	not	be	able	to	hide	behind	
the	shield	of	sovereignty	to	avoid	financial	contributions	for	Baigent’s	damages	payable	by	the	
NZ	Police	and	GCSB	as	a	direct	result	of	any	enforcement	activity	undertaken	within	the	terms	
of	the	initial	mutual	assistance	request.		
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Kim	Dotcom	cause	célèbre	
Variously	described	as	 a	 ‘big,	 jovial	 internet	mogul’	 (Editorial	2012),	 a	 ‘controversial	 internet	
tycoon’	(Bennett	2013),	‘one	of	the	world’s	most	“flamboyant”	computer	hackers’	(Fisher	2011),	
a	‘celebrity	du	jour’	and	a	‘larger‐than‐life	oddball’	(Rudman	2013),	Dotcom	remains	an	enigma	
as	 one	 of	 the	 ten	wealthiest	 people	 in	NZ.	 The	Megaupload	 indictments	 solidify	 his	 role	 as	 a	
prominent	critic	of	proposed	legislation	to	enhance	the	GCSB’s	surveillance	capacity	to	combat	
terrorism,	enhance	cyber	security,	and	legalise	information	sharing	amongst	NZ	police,	security	
and	defence	agencies	(Young	2013b).	The	NZ	Prime	Minister	dismisses	Dotcom	as	a	‘conspiracy	
theorist’	(Young	2013a)	who	‘loves	the	limelight’	(Protest	marches	against	GCSB	bill	across	NZ	
2013)	 and	 fuels	 unnecessary	 public	 anxieties	 that	 challenge	 NZ’s	 national	 security	 interests	
through	 unsubstantiated	 claims	 the	 GCSB	 operates	 as	 the	 compliant	 subsidiary	 of	 the	 US	
National	Security	Agency	(NSA).	These	claims	are	considered	part	of	Dotcom’s	 long‐term	self‐
serving	agenda	to	remain	in	NZ	‘forever’.	
	
The	raids	and	their	subsequent	fallout	generated	considerable	global	interest	in	Dotcom’s	lavish	
and	eccentric	lifestyle.	He	has	self‐funded	and	produced	two	films,	Kimble	Goes	to	Monaco	and	
Kimble	 Goes	 to	 Monaco	 Part	 II,	 which	 star	 leading	 German	 female	 centrefold	 models	 and	
document	his	penchant	for	fast	cars,	yachts	and	partying	at	the	2000	and	2001	Monaco	Grand	
Prix	(Pappademas	2012).	Before	Kimble	officially	changed	his	surname	to	Dotcom	in	2005	when	
Megaupload	was	 formally	 established	 in	Hong	Kong,	 he	was	 convicted	 of	 insider	 trading	 and	
pleaded	 guilty	 to	 embezzlement	 under	 German	 law,	 which	 lead	 to	 two	 20‐month	 probation	
terms	 and	 fines	 totalling	 €100,000	 (Gallagher	 2012).	 After	 the	 NZ	 raids,	 he	 publicly	 warned	
members	 of	 the	 online	 protest	 group	 Anonymous	 to	 stop	 hacking	 the	 websites	 of	 NZ	
government	ministers	or	risk	strengthening	claims	for	more	expansive	GCSB	powers	to	combat	
cybercrime	(Backhouse	and	Shuttleworth	2013).	This	warning	coincided	with	extensive	public	
consternation	about	the	organisational	culture	of	the	GSBC	and	revelations	of	its	surveillance	of	
several	 NZ	 journalists	 (Edwards	 2013).	 A	 short	 online	 ‘mash	 up’	 of	 police	 video	 footage	 and	
CCTV	images	of	the	raid,	accompanied	by	Dotcom’s	own	original	music	and	digital	animations,	is	
depicted	as	part	of	a	broader	‘publicity	campaign’	against	the	US	indictments	(Staff	Writers/AAP	
2013).	The	video	is	careful	to	conceal	the	identities	of	police	officers	in	line	with	orders	issued	
during	 court	 proceedings	 that	 prohibited	 the	 release	 of	 certain	 images	 and	 other	 strategic	
documents	with	the	potential	to	cause	‘danger	to	staff	in	future	operations’	(Dotcom	v	Attorney‐
General	#2	[2012]	NZHC	2000;	Dotcom	v	Attorney‐General	#5	[2013]	NZHC	695).	
	
The	 theatrics	 of	 the	NZ	 raid	 and	 its	 global	 depiction	 as	 news	 replicates	 other	 large‐scale	 law	
enforcement	and	securitisation	initiatives.	The	desire	to	assist	the	FBI	with	its	MACMA	request	
undoubtedly	promoted	the	construction	of	an	image	of	NZ	policing	as	tough,	uncompromising	
and	 pivotal	 to	 the	 success	 of	 a	 significant	 global	 criminal	 investigation.	 The	 displays	 of	
paramilitary	and	military	force,	extensive	tactical	coordination	based	on	covert	intelligence,	and	
the	selective	distribution	of	graphic	imagery	and	contentious	factual	descriptions	of	the	raid	to	
preferred	media	outlets,	mirror	the	theatre	of	law	enforcement	activities	at	various	major	global	
political	and	cultural	events,	including	the	Olympic	Games	(Boyle	and	Haggerty	2009,	2012)	and	
the	annual	G20	economic	summits	(Monaghan	and	Walby	2012).	Speculation	‘the	raid	made	in	
Hollywood’	 (Amsterdam	 and	 Rothken	 2013:	 14‐16)	 involved	 questionable	 force	 with	 lasting	
impacts	on	Dotcom,	his	pregnant	wife	and	his	three	children,	have	been	met	by	counterclaims	
that	 police	 misconduct	 was	 defensible,	 as	 police	 were	 forced	 to	 enter	 a	 secure	 ‘panic	 room’	
while	 Dotcom’s	 burly	 figure	 lunged	 towards	 a	 firearm.	 It	 was	 later	 reported	 the	 weapon	
remained	inside	a	locked	safe	and	was	loaded	with	a	single	rubber	bullet	(Fisher	2012).	
	
In	 May	 2012,	 a	 48‐page	 whitepaper	 co‐authored	 by	 two	 lawyers	 working	 for	 Dotcom	
systematically	attacked	the	 ‘baseless’	allegations	and	‘dubious	legal	principles’	associated	with	
‘the	largest	copyright	case	in	history’.	US	concern	over	the	criminal	enterprise	neglected	various	
attempts	by	Megaupload	 to	 ‘guard	against	 copyright	 infringements’	 (Amsterdam	and	Rothken	
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2013:	 2‐5).	 However,	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Justice	 claims	 that	 regular	 violations	 of	 a	
permissible	 daily	 threshold	 of	 5,000	 ‘copyright	 takedowns’,	 largely	 detected	 through	
surveillance	of	 file	 sharing	 activity	 in	Megaupload	by	 the	US	entertainment	 industry,	 justified	
criminal	 prosecution	 due	 to	 the	 evident	 failure	 of	 voluntary	 compliance	 with	 numerous	
directives	 issued	 by	 US	 law	 enforcement	 officials	 (Fisher	 2012).	 The	 whitepaper	 challenges	
these	 justifications	 for	 such	 an	 ‘overly	 expansive	 and	 unsupported	 legal	 theory	 of	 criminal	
liability’	 that	 tests	 the	 limits	 of	 conventional	 notions	of	US	 sovereignty	 and	has	been	 ‘littered	
with	due	process	violations’	(Amsterdam	and	Rothken	2013:	 	5‐11).	Of	specific	concern	 is	 the	
confiscation	 of	 all	Megaupload	property	 and	user	 data	 under	US	 law	via	 ‘an	 ex	 parte	 hearing	
without	 prior	 notice,	 hearing,	 or	 opportunity	 for	 defence,	 and	 with	 no	 effective	 remedy	
afterward’	(Amsterdam	and	Rothken	2013:	46).	While	this	statement	is	only	partly	true	as	these	
issues	have	been	subject	to	various	review	processes	within	the	NZ	court	system,	it	reinforces	
the	highly	emotive	underpinnings	of	this	approach	to	extraterritorial	policing,	surveillance	and	
prosecutorial	decision‐making.		
	
These	 issues	 must	 be	 considered	 alongside	 news	 of	 the	 NSA’s	 Prism	 surveillance	 program,	
which	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 the	 source	 of	much	 online	 surveillance	 undertaken	 by	US	 authorities	 to	
support	 the	 federal	 criminal	 indictments.	 Global	 revelations	 about	 Prism	 provided	 the	
opportunity	 for	 Dotcom	 to	 publicly	 affirm	 that	 his	 concerns	 about	 the	 role	 of	 ‘the	 state	 as	 a	
potential	 threat	 to	 basic	 civil	 rights	 and	 liberties	 –	 may	 have	 been	 right	 all	 along’	 (Dotcom	
2013).	In	an	informed	opinion	piece	for	The	Guardian,	which	was	one	of	the	major	news	outlets	
documenting	leaks	about	the	global	 implications	of	Prism’s	online	surveillance	activities	along	
with	 the	Washington	Post,	Dotcom	reiterated	key	arguments	 in	 the	whitepaper	 indicating	 this	
form	 of	 surveillance,	 and	 the	 highly	 selective	 US	 law	 enforcement	 and	 private	 corporate	
interests	it	promotes,	affect	the	rights	of	all	citizens	under	the	Echelon/Five	Eyes	program.		
	
I	have	emphasised	that	I	am	being	prosecuted	not	because	the	charges	against	me	
have	 some	 sound	 basis	 in	 US	 copyright	 law,	 but	 because	 the	 US	 justice	
department	 has	 been	 instrumentalised	 by	 certain	 private	 interests	 that	 have	 a	
financial	 stake	 in	neutralising	my	business.	That	 trend	 represents	 a	danger	not	
just	to	me,	but	to	all	of	us	(Dotcom	2013).	
	
Once	 news	 of	 Prism	 emerged,	 the	 American	 Civil	 Liberties	 Union	 (ACLU)	 re‐launched	 a	
significant	 case	 against	 the	 US	 federal	 government	 alleging	 the	 breach	 of	 several	 civil	 rights	
protections	 under	 the	 US	 Constitution.	 The	 ACLU	 uses	 Verizon,	 one	 of	 three	 major	 US	
telecommunications	 companies	 that	 allegedly	 supplies	 the	NSA	with	 ‘metadata’	 revealing	 the	
identity	 of	 phone	 numbers	 and	 the	 time,	 length	 and	 location	 of	 incoming	 and	 outgoing	 calls	
throughout	 the	 US	 (American	 Civil	 Liberties	 Union	 v	 Clapper	 2013	 at	 para	 31).	 The	 ACLU	
questions	 this	 surveillance	 practice.	 One	 reason	 is	 many	 telephone	 communications	 involve	
legally	 privileged	 discussions	 with	 clients	 regarding	 actual	 or	 prospective	 legal	 proceedings	
against	 US	 federal	 agencies	 (American	 Civil	 Liberties	 Union	 v	 Clapper	 2013	 at	 para	 25).	
Proposed	legislative	reforms	in	NZ	will	allow	the	GCSB	to	access	equivalent	telecommunications	
metadata.	 Thus,	 Kim	 Dotcom’s	 advocacy	 converges	 around	 several	 crucial	 political	
developments	 associated	 with	 state	 surveillance	 practices	 in	 NZ	 and	 the	 US,	 which	 are	
intertwined	 with	 the	 expanded	 transnational	 reach	 of	 US	 criminal	 laws,	 enforcement	 and	
mutual	assistance	initiatives	associated	with	online	piracy.	The	launch	of	MEGA,	the	cloud‐based	
successor	 to	 Megaupload	 (Fletcher	 2013a),	 might	 add	 further	 weight	 to	 intensified	
transnational	criminal	copyright	enforcement	(Fletcher	2013b),	or	could	invoke	more	efficient	
data	 encryption	 (Barton	2013a)	 and	 digital	 blocking	 technology	 to	 prevent	 online	 piracy	 and	
protect	 information	 about	 registered	 users	 from	 questionable	 forms	 of	 surveillance	 and	 data	
exchange	amongst	law	enforcement	agencies	within	the	Echelon/Five	Eyes	group.		
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Conclusion:	Global	policing,	information	flows	and	sovereign	authority	
The	 complexity	 of	 Kim	 Dotcom’s	 case	 highlights	 several	 technicalities	 and	 regulatory	 gaps	
associated	 with	 the	 global	 consumption	 of	 digital	 media	 (David	 2010)	 and	 commensurate	
deficits	 in	 the	 application	 of	 due	 process	 principles	 to	 transnational	 surveillance,	 intelligence	
gathering	 and	 law	 enforcement	 procedures.	 Principles	 of	 sovereignty	 that	 invoke	 territorial	
jurisdictional	 boundaries	 to	 constrain	 extraterritorial	 policing	 activity	 are	 significantly	
challenged	by	global	information	flows,	and	related	commercial	interests	that	favour	enhanced	
transnational	law	enforcement	capacities.	The	ability	of	private	corporations	and	public	police	
to	engage	in	extensive	online	surveillance	of	suspect	P2P	and	cloud	services	(David	2010:	5)	has	
significant	 implications	 for	 notions	 of	 individual	 privacy	 (Drury	 2012).	 These	 issues	 are	
magnified	 in	 transnational	 criminal	 investigations	 where	 traditional	 national	 due	 process	
constraints	 governing	 state	 surveillance	 do	 not	 adequately	 encapsulate	 informal	 requests	 for	
investigative	 assistance,	 which	 may	 or	 may	 not	 be	 formalised	 through	 recognised	 mutual	
assistance	 requirements.	 Extensive	 transnational	 flows	 of	 criminal	 intelligence	 and	 other	
surveillance	 activity	 through	 collaborative	 securitisation	 measures	 such	 as	 the	 Echelon/Five	
Eyes	agreement	appear	to	remain	beyond	critical	public	or	regulatory	scrutiny.		
	
However,	the	cases	documented	in	this	paper	challenge	arguments	that	transnational	policing	is	
totally	immune	from	regulatory	control	(Anderson	1989;	Deflem	2004).	In	fact,	the	Dotcom	case	
reveals	 several	 contradictions	 between	 US	 and	 NZ	 search	warrant,	 information	 seizure,	 data	
transfer	 and	 judicial	 review	procedures	 that	 are	 far	 from	being	 fully	 ‘harmonised’	 or	 aligned.	
Chief	 Justice	Winkelmann’s	 rulings	 declaring	 the	 NZ	 search	warrants	 to	 be	 invalid	might	 not	
have	 been	 able	 to	 prevent	 the	 initial	 unlawful	 transfer	 or	 destruction	 of	 sensitive	 personal	
information	about	registered	users	of	Megaupload	that	has	been	unlawfully	conveyed	to	US	law	
enforcement	 authorities.	 However,	 these	 rulings	 allow	 for	 the	 qualified	 disclosure	 of	 this	
information	 for	Kim	Dotcom’s	extradition	and	any	related	proceedings	associated	with	 the	US	
federal	 indictments.	Despite	 the	 initially	 informal	nature	of	 the	mutual	 assistance	 request,	 its	
subsequent	formalisation	and	the	related	court	rulings	associated	with	the	NZ	raid,	the	seizure	
of	 evidence,	 its	 cloning	 and	 ultimate	 transfer	 to	 the	 FBI	 were	 subject	 to rigorous	 judicial	
scrutiny	 in	 line	 with	 the	 local	 contingencies	 of	 NZ	 criminal	 and	 human	 rights	 laws.	 These	
avenues	 temper	 claims	 about	 the	 ‘Americanisation’	 of	 global	 policing	 via	 the	 regularisation,	
accommodation	and	homogenisation	of	highly	selective	US	 law	enforcement	 interests	 in	other	
nations	(Nadelmann	1993).		
	
Dotcom	and	his	associates	have	been	able	to	fund	up	to	10,000	hours	of	legal	representation	in	
NZ	partly	due	to	the	release	of	$NZ2.7	million	in	funds	from	the	various	asset	seizures.	This	sum	
does	not	cover	legal	advice	relating	to	Megaupload’s	Hong	Kong	or	US	business	activities	(Fisher	
2013).	 However,	 for	 a	 growing	 number	 of	 people	 enmeshed	 in	 transnational	 criminal	
investigations,	 such	 resources	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 available.	 Further,	 the	 overall	 costs	 of	
deploying	 resources	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 extensive	 legal	 challenges	 associated	 with	
transnational	 criminal	 investigations	are	a	 significant	barrier	 to	open	and	 transparent	 justice,	
particularly	 due	 to	 the	 expenses	 associated	 with	 implementing	 mutual	 assistance	 requests,	
collecting	and	securely	transferring	evidence,	and	ensuring	witness	testimony	can	be	presented	
and	tested	in	court	proceedings	(Flynn	and	Fitz‐Gibbon	2013).	By	April	2012,	legal	challenges	in	
the	 Dotcom	 case	 cost	 NZ	 taxpayers	 an	 estimated	 $NZ1.12	 million,	 independently	 of	 the	
undisclosed	financial	costs	of	resources	provided	to	the	investigation	by	NZ	Police	and	the	GCSB.	
Further	estimates	suggest	these	costs	are	likely	to	increase	to	$NZ4	or	$NZ5	million	by	the	time	
of	 Dotcom’s	 extradition	 hearing	 (Barton	 2013b).	 By	 contrast,	 reports	 suggest	 that	 since	
Megaupload	 was	 closed	 by	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 two	 major	 movie	 studios	 report	
increased	 revenues	 of	 between	 $US1.1	 and	 $US1.9	 million	 from	 online	 sales	 and	 rental	
arrangements	(Collins	2013).	Such	figures	add	weight	to	the	financial	arguments	supporting	the	
more	 rigorous	 transnational	 enforcement	 of	 criminal	 copyright	 laws	 (McCourt	 and	 Burkart	
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2003),	 even	 though	 the	 main	 beneficiary	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 the	 private	 entertainment	 industry	
rather	than	the	state.		
	
Case	 studies	 such	 as	 this	 are	 an	 important	 means	 of	 understanding	 contemporary	 global	
policing	 developments.	 Legal	 case	 analysis	 does	 not	 replace	 the	 need	 for	 thick	 descriptions	
emanating	 from	ethnographic	research	(Nadelmann	1993),	nor	does	 it	 seek	 to	re‐cloak	global	
policing	 developments	 within	 narrow	 and	 restrictive	 ‘rule‐of‐law’	 principles.	 Bowling	 and	
Sheptycki	(2012:	130)	caution	that	global	policing	should	not	be	understood	primarily	through	
the	rule‐of‐law.	Rather,	the	analysis	of	written	law	should	be	seen	as	a	resource	to	examine	‘rule	
with	 law’,	by	 circumscribing	global	policing	practices	 through	 law.	The	Dotcom	case	 indicates	
tensions	 between	 US	 and	 NZ	 policing	 approaches	 and	 legal	 requirements	 have	 significant	
implications	 for	 any	 transnational	 prosecutions	 that	 reveal	 an	 extremely	 disjointed	
harmonisation	of	contemporary	global	enforcement	and	mutual	assistance	arrangements.	While	
judicial	review	can	address	overt	procedural	gaps,	and	invoke	awareness	of	arguments	such	as	
the	existence	of	Baigent’s	compensation	that	might	have	significant	effects	in	shaping	desirable	
extraterritorial	 policing	 activities,	 they	 could	 equally	 validate	 and	 entrench	 problematic	
transnational	 enforcement	 arrangements	 in	 other	 cases.	 The	 cases	 documented	 in	 this	 paper	
demonstrate	the	importance	of	formal	judicial	rulings	as	evidence	of	‘rule	with	law’	that	reveal	
the	relationship	between	external	review	and	legal	resistance	towards	the	unchecked	collection	
and	 distribution	 of	 criminal	 intelligence	 for	 transnational	 law	 enforcement	 purposes.	 These	
issues	 remain	 open	 to	 further	 and	 ongoing	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 mutual	 assistance	
arrangements,	their	implementation	and	their	capacity	to	be	subject	to	various	modes	of	formal	
independent	scrutiny	under	established	sovereign	legal	processes.	
	
Finally,	intellectual	property	law	was	developed	to	protect	commercial	interests	associated	with	
burgeoning	nineteenth	century	print	industries	(Mazzone	2011).	Debate	about	the	suitability	of	
the	criminal	law	in	governing	various	forms	of	internet	activity	is	ongoing	and	magnified	by	the	
difficulties	 of	 applying	 the	 logics	 of	 criminalisation	 to	 regulate	 any	 transnational	 or	
international	 behaviour	 (Findlay	 2008).	 In	 the	 online	world,	 competing	 claims	 to	 justice	 and	
procedural	 fairness	 involve	 the	 simultaneous	 normalisation	 of	 contentious	 surveillance,	 data	
mining,	 locational	 tracking	 and	 other	 digital	 assemblage	 technologies	 in	 the	 contemporary	
global	policing	armoury	(Haggerty	and	Ericson	2006).	These	appear	logical	measures	to	combat	
copyfraud	 (Mazzone	2011)	 and	other	wrongful	 behaviour	 associated	with	 digital	 information	
flows.	However,	the	borderless	nature	of	cyber	culture	places	users	of	digital	technology	under	
increased	surveillance	and	risk	of	exposure	to	complex	prosecutions	in	offshore	locations.	One	
particularly	disturbing	legacy	of	the	Kim	Dotcom	saga	is	that	data	containing	the	identities	and	
locations	of	all	Megaupload	are	likely	to	remain	in	the	possession	of	US	authorities,	even	though	
NZ	law	has	later	declared	this	information	to	have	been	obtained	unlawfully.	As	such,	we	remain	
concerned	that	the	rule‐of‐law	must	be	incorporated	as	a	central	element	of	a	broader	suite	of	
global	 policing	 accountability	 mechanisms	 that	 acknowledges	 the	 prospect	 for	 meaningful	
resistance	to	questionable	extraterritorial	law	enforcement	activity	not	only	by	individuals	such	
as	 Dotcom,	 but	 also	 via	 activist	 civil	 libertarian	 groups	 and	 sovereign	 judicial	 review	
mechanisms.	The	 cases	documented	 and	 analysed	 above	offer	 a	pertinent	 site	 for	 the	 further	
examination	of	these	issues,	and	their	potential	endorsement	and	contestation	of	questionable	
extraterritorial	policing	and	surveillance	arrangements	in	the	contemporary	digital	age.		
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